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[Since the ceasefire ending the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994, the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group has attempted to mediate 
the ongoing territorial dispute between the two states concerning the region known as ‘Artsakh’ 
or ‘Nagorny Karabagh’. This piece argues that the failure to achieve a compromise solution, 
amidst the increasing threat of a renewal of armed conflict, calls for consideration of 
adjudication as a feasible and desirable means of dispute resolution in this case. This article 
analyses the merits of the dispute in order to identify the legal tensions and how they might be 
resolved. First, the piece examines the historical background of the dispute in order to trace the 
territorial title to the region from the 19th century to the present day. It then analyses the legal 
positions of the parties to expose how both states aim to maximise their negotiating leverage, 
taking little account of international law or, indeed, political reality in asserting their positions. 
Finally, it examines the merits of the dispute and possible adjudicated solutions to the issue of 
territorial title.] 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Seventeen thousand dead, one million displaced, six years of destruction — 
the war for the disputed territory of Artsakh,1 from the local ethnic clashes of 
18–20 September 1988 to the ceasefire of 12 May 1994, resulted in the 
Armenians’ military victory with 11 797 square kilometres or 13.62 per cent of 
the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan’s territory under de facto 
Armenian control.2 What cannot be quantified is the amount of human suffering, 
ingrained hatred and lost opportunities. Refugees and internally displaced 
persons on both sides, but especially in Azerbaijan, subsist in miserable 
conditions. Armenia perseveres under a crippling economic blockade from 
Azerbaijan and Turkey. Artsakh itself remains an international ‘black hole’ in a 
state of legal limbo. After 12 years of failed peace negotiations, the main purpose 
of this study is to advocate the settlement of the dispute through adjudication. A 
legal solution would break the stalemate and resolve the dispute by peaceful 
means; a fortiori, judicial development of coherent principles of territorial 
sovereignty would promote the just resolution of similar disputes.3  
The conventional description of the dispute as a fundamental clash between 
the rights of self-determination and the territorial integrity of states4 is 
erroneous.5 The conflict is not a case of unilateral secession from a parent state, 
but rather a territorial dispute between two states — the first Republics of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, which existed from 1918–20 — that ‘revived’ with 
regained independence in 1991. The common frontier between the two states, 
determinable solely by mutual consent, is the crux of the dispute. The competing 
principles for determination of that frontier are self-determination, uti possidetis 
juris and conquest. This article submits that, of these modes of acquisitive title, 
self-determination is the most likely to achieve a lasting outcome. 
In this sensitive and politicised topic, it is vital to lay out the historical 
foundation before engaging in legal analysis.6 Whilst this article does not seek to 
examine the entire history of the Artsakh region, the pertinent legal and political 
history of the dispute — from 1813 to the present day — is addressed in order to 
identify the issues arising under international law. The article then considers the 
legal positions of the parties concerned, namely, the Republics of Armenia and 
of Azerbaijan, and the self-declared, but internationally unrecognised, ‘Republic 
of Mountainous Karabagh’. Whilst the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (‘OSCE’) Minsk Group aims to achieve a negotiated 
                                                 
 1 This term refers to the former Soviet autonomous oblast, more commonly known by the 
Russian-Persian term Nagorny Karabagh. 
 2 Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (2003) 
284–6. 
 3 See, eg, Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras) [2007] ICJ Rep 1.  
 4 Charter of the United Nations arts 1(2), 2(4). 
 5 See Robert Maguire, ‘Decolonization of Belize: Self-Determination v Territorial Integrity’ 
(1982) 22 Virginia Journal of International Law 849, 859–61.  
 6 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) (Judgment) [2005] ICJ [5]–[14] (Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans) 
<http://www.icj-cij.org> at 23 May 2008. 
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solution to the conflict through mediation,7 the possibility of a contentious case 
in the International Court Justice cannot be entirely discounted.8 This study 
therefore analyses the relevant principles of international law against the current 
backdrop of diplomatic negotiation, but also with a view to the (admittedly 
unlikely) event of both states agreeing to settle the dispute by litigious means. 
In Part IV, the analysis addresses the merits of the parties’ legal arguments 
and analyses various solutions available under international law. The primary 
focus of the discussion is the legal merits of the Artsakh dispute per se. 
Secondary focus is given to the relevance of the discussion to various other 
‘frozen’ territorial disputes. 
II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE 
This section examines the historical background of the dispute and identifies 
the key legal and political issues relevant to its resolution. In analysing the armed 
conflict between the first Republics of 1917–20, the doctrine of intertemporal 
law must be borne in mind. This doctrine provides that a dispute must be 
adjudged according to the laws in force at the relevant time,9 in this case 
validating conquest as a mode of acquisitive title and precluding 
self-determination as a relevant consideration.10 The legal and political effects of 
the Soviet period will then be addressed. Analysis of this era reveals the strategic 
considerations that prevent a negotiated solution. Moreover, the origins of the 
current erroneous focus on ‘self-determination’ versus ‘territorial integrity’ 
become apparent within the context of state succession to the Soviet Union in 
1990.11 
A Ethnography of the Region: 1813–1917 
Attempts have been made by various commentators to contextualise the 
dispute historically in order to establish ‘historic title’ to the territory.12 These 
arguments typically cite population censuses as well as cultural monuments, such 
                                                 
 7 See below Part III(D). 
 8 Neither state has acceded to the optional clause jurisdiction of the ICJ under the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice art 34. Alternative fora include ad hoc or institutional 
arbitration, such as the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (‘OSCE Court’). 
Armenia acceded on 8 October 2001 to the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration 
within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, opened for signature 15 December 1992, 32 ILM 551 (1993) 
(entered into force 5 December 1994), but Azerbaijan has not. On the desirability of 
adjudication generally, and for territorial disputes in particular, see Richard Bilder, ‘Some 
Limitations on Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement Technique’ (1982) 23 
Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 7–9. On general compliance problems with ICJ 
judgments, especially on land boundary disputes, see Robert Jennings, ‘The International 
Court of Justice After Fifty Years’ (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 493; 
Colter Paulson, ‘Compliance with Final Judgements of the International Court of Justice 
since 1987’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 434, 437–43, 449–61. 
 9 Island of Palmas (The Netherlands v US) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 845 (‘Island of Palmas’). 
 10 Matthew McMahon, Conquest and Modern International Law: The Legal Limitations on the 
Acquisition of Territory by Conquest (1975) 4, 150. 
 11 See below Part IV(B). 
 12 Michael Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (1998)  
11–12; Levon Chorbajian, Patrick Donabedian and Claude Mutafian, The Caucasian Knot: 
The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh (1994) 4–13. 
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as mosques or churches, as evidence of the notion of an ‘indigenous people’.13 
The futility of this line of argument becomes apparent when one considers the 
continuous history of war and conquest throughout the Transcaucasus region, 
with the resulting ethnic cleansing campaigns and demographic changes.14 At 
least within the context of legal arguments, propositions based upon a notional 
‘ancient or original title’ have limited evidentiary application.15 
The legal history of the Artsakh dispute begins with the Treaty of Gulistan of 
1813 ending the First Russo-Persian War.16 Under the treaty, Persia ceded 
sovereignty of the Artsakh province to Imperial Russia.17 In 1826, sovereignty of 
the Eastern Armenian and Northern Azeri provinces was likewise ceded under 
the Treaty of Turkmenchai.18 Under Russian jurisdiction, the province of 
Nakhichevan was part of the administrative region of Yerevan, whilst Artsakh 
and Zangezour were at first part of the Caspian district, but were then 
incorporated within a new Elivasetpol district under administrative reforms in 
1840, enlarging the former Karabagh Khanate administrative unit within 
Persia.19 
Ethnic friction first developed during this period when peoples migrated to 
each other’s historically inhabited lands, resulting in, for example, Armenian 
communities in Tiflis and Baku.20 Azeri villages were similarly found near 
Yerevan and clusters of ethnic minorities were scattered throughout the 
Transcaucasus.21 With the end of the Imperial Government in the 1917 October 
Revolution, the Transcaucasian Federative Democratic Republic was declared.22 
This experiment in cooperative federalist governance was short-lived, primarily 
due to nationalist aspirations. On 26 May 1918, the Georgians declared 
independence and the Azeris and the Armenians soon followed suit.23 
B The Struggle for Transcaucasia: 1917–20 
The interregnum until the Soviet Union’s conquest saw a series of inter-ethnic 
territorial wars. The three disputed territories between the new states of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan were Nakhichevan, Zangezour and Artsakh.24 Demographically, 
                                                 
 13 de Waal, above n 2, 148–50; Guner Ozkan, ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Problem: Claims, 
Counterclaims, and Impasse’ (2006) 1 Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies 118, 
119. For theoretical background on the concept of ‘ethnicity’, see Roger Ballard, ‘Ethnicity: 
Theory and Experience’ (1976) 5 New Community 196. 
 14 See generally Hratch Tchilingirian, ‘Nagorno Karabagh: Transition and the Elite’ (1999) 18 
Central Asian Survey 435, 436–40. 
 15 See Minquiers and Ecrehos (UK v France) (Judgment) [1953] ICJ Rep 47, 53, 56, where 
‘historical controversies’ were examined as evidence of links between a disputed territory 
and two sovereign claimants, not as the legal basis for title of peoples per se. 
 16 Treaty of Gulistan, signed 12 October 1813, Russia-Persia (confirmed 15 September 1814), 
reproduced in (1817–18) 5 British and Foreign State Papers 1109. 
 17 See John Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (1908) 90. 
 18 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 78 ConTS 105 (signed and entered into force 10 February 
1828) (‘Treaty of Turkmenchai’). 
 19 Croissant, above n 12, 12–13. 
 20 A N Yamskov, ‘Ethnic Conflicts in the Transcausasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh’ 20 
Theory and Society 631, 633. 
 21 Croissant, above n 12, 12–13. 
 22 Firuz Kazamzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917–1921) (1959) 117, 124–7. 
 23 Ibid. 
 24 de Waal, above n 2, 127. 
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the Azeris enjoyed a 60 per cent majority in Nakhichevan;25 the population of 
Zangezour was evenly split;26 and the Armenians enjoyed a 94 per cent majority 
in Artsakh.27 On 22 July 1918, the Armenian population of Artsakh convened the 
First Armenian National Assembly of Karabagh in the provincial capital of 
Shushi.28 Whilst Armenia, along with the Nagorny Karabagh Republic (‘NKR’), 
has attempted to utilise these ethnic divisions as evidence of an intention for 
statehood,29 contemporary historical documents indicate the intention of the 
Artsakh Armenians to unify with Armenia.30 
Under Armenia’s decentralised system of governance, regional councils 
functioned with policing, military and jurisdictional autonomy but were 
ultimately subject to the central government. This is evident from the Armenian 
parliamentary decision on the principles of government in Zangezour and 
Karabagh declaring the regions of Zangezour and Karabagh to be integral parts 
of Armenia, the Goris and Shushi National Councils to be regional governments, 
and their inclusion in the national budget.31 This undermines the proposition that 
Armenians of the time intended to create several independent states. On the 
contrary, major political divisions on this point existed only in Shushi, where the 
merchant class favoured a policy of appeasement with Baku, arguing that 
Artsakh’s geopolitical situation made it a natural trader with Baku.32 The rest of 
the Artsakh population favoured unification with the Republic.33 
In December 1919, local Armenian irregulars defeated their Azeri 
counterparts in Zangezour and established Armenian supremacy.34 They then 
invaded Artsakh but withdrew upon the demand of the British occupiers of Baku 
on the promise that the territorial issue would be decided at the Paris Peace 
Conference.35 The British set up a temporary jurisdiction, appointing the ethnic 
Azeri Dr Khostrov Bey Sultanov as Governor-General, with an advisory council 
of three Armenians and three Azeris.36 Armenia protested this action as contrary 
to its territorial rights. The Fourth Armenian National Assembly of Karabagh 
                                                 
 25 Zohrabyan, The National Battles in Yerevan Province 1918 (2000) 77 [trans of: 
Ազգամիջյան գռիվները Երևանի նահանգում 1918] (author’s own translation). 
 26 Richard Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia Volume II: From Versailles to London, 
1919–1920 (1982) 207 (‘From Versailles to London’). 
 27 de Waal, above n 2, 130. 
 28 Shahen Avakian, Nagorno-Karabagh Legal Aspects (2005) 9 
<http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/fr/nk/legalaspects/legalaspect_full.pdf> at 23 
May 2008. 
 29 For the Armenian Foreign Ministry, see ibid. For the NKR Foreign Ministry, see Armen 
Zalinyan, What Prevails in the Karabagh Settlement: International Law or a Right on 
Policy? (Unpublished manuscript, 2006) 7 (copy on file with author). 
 30 See, eg, Annex 3 of ‘Circular from the British Command’ in File 9 of the Republic of 
Armenia Archives. 
 31 Khachakhetsian, The Armenian Republic 1918–1920, Political History: Legal Documents 
and Files (2000) 85–7 [trans of: Հայաստանի հանրապետությանը 1918–1920 թթ. 
(քաղաքական պատմությունը), փաստաթուղթերի և նյութերի ժողովածու] 
(author’s own translation). 
 32 Croissant, above n 12, 12. 
 33 Richard Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia Volume III: From London to Sevrès, 
February–August 1920 (1996) 131–4 (‘From London to Sevrès’). 
 34 de Waal, above n 2, 128. 
 35 Ibid. 
 36 Ibid. 
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likewise protested Azerbaijan’s assertion of sovereignty.37 Armenia then passed 
two laws, the first declaring ‘a “Free and United Armenia” including Karabagh 
and Nakhichevan’38 and the second specifically asserting its sovereignty over 
Artsakh.39 
In April 1919, Armenia occupied Nakhichevan and declared martial law as 
part of the Yerevan administrative province.40 A governor was appointed and 
police and courts were installed. In August, Azeri forces expelled the Armenian 
troops and a governor was appointed by Baku.41 Armenia then shifted its 
attention to Zangezour, which the Azeris unsuccessfully invaded in November.42 
The Artsakh Armenians, upon the British withdrawal from Baku in August, 
agreed in their Fourth National Assembly to a ceasefire with the Azeri 
Government continuing the temporary jurisdiction of Sultanov.43 Articles 15 and 
16 required that garrisons be of peacetime strength and any movement of Azeri 
troops be authorised by two-thirds of the Council.44 
Sultanov, acting without such approval, occupied several Armenian villages 
and instituted an economic blockade to coerce the Armenian population into 
recognition of Azeri sovereignty.45 The Eighth Armenian Assembly of Karabagh 
convened in the village of Shosh and, on 28 February 1920, categorically 
rejected the Azeri demands.46 Sultanov then convened a group of Armenian 
merchants in Shushi and, under threat of ‘dire consequences’, the group 
expressed its willingness to consider conditional submission to Azerbaijan.47 
Using this as a pretext, Sultanov then moved more troops into the province in 
anticipation of an Armenian uprising, which commenced on 21 March 1920.48  
On 22 April 1920, the Ninth Armenian Assembly of Karabagh declared the 
provisional agreement null and the union of Artsakh and Armenia.49 Armenia 
simultaneously occupied Nakhichevan, Zangezour and Artsakh for the first 
time.50 Azerbaijan was succumbing to invasion by the Soviet Union, with the 
result that the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan (‘SSR of Azerbaijan’) was 
                                                 
 37 Khachakhetsian, above n 31, 85–7. 
 38 Armenian Resolution on the Armenian Position at the Paris Conference (12 February 1919), 
cited in Khachakhetsian, above n 31, 89–91. 
 39 The Republic of Armenia Government Decision regarding the Governance of Karabagh (30 
May 1919), cited in Khachakhetsian, above n 31, 104. 
 40 Richard Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia Volume I: The First Year 1989–1919 (1971) 
241 (‘The First Year’). 
 41 Hovannisian, From Versailles to London, above n 26, 105–6. 
 42 Ibid 106–7. 
 43 Provisional Accord between the Armenians of Karabagh and the Government of Azerbaijan, 
signed 28 August 1919, Azerbaijan–Armenia, reproduced in Hovannisian, The First Year, 
above n 40, 186–7. 
 44 Ibid. 
 45 Hovannisian, From London to Sevrès, above n 33, 138.  
 46 Republic of Armenia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum on the Armenian Political 
Situation in Karabagh presented by the Eighth Assembly of Karabagh to the Representatives 
of the Allied Powers and Transcaucasian Republics (1920) 
<http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/fr/nk/nk_file/article/15.html> at 23 May 2008. 
 47 Hovannisian, From London to Sevrès, above n 33, 144–5. 
 48 Ibid 143. 
 49 Ibid 159. 
 50 Ibid. 
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proclaimed on 28 April 1920 in Baku.51 Armenia’s occupation lasted until 10 
August 1920, when an agreement was signed recognising de facto Soviet 
occupation of the three provinces, subject to final determination of their status in 
later negotiations.52 
This history of war between the first Republics may give rise to claims of 
sovereignty acquired by conquest. For Azerbaijan, the provisional agreement 
between itself and the Armenian National Councils from January 1919 until 
April 1920, coupled with the appointment of a Karabagh Azeri as 
Governor-General, could be characterised as an assertion of sovereignty over the 
region. On the other hand, Armenia could argue that its proclamations of 
annexation, coupled with the direct subjugation to Yerevan from April until July 
1920, constitute conquest.  
C The Soviet Era: 1920–91 
The Turkish War of Independence, instigated by Mustapha Kemal, 
successfully prevented the Treaty of Sevrès,53 signed on 10 August 1920, from 
being implemented. Turkey invaded Armenia and, in November 1920, occupied 
the Kars and Aleksandropol provinces so that the Armenian government, 
hemmed in between the Soviets and the Turks, fell in a Soviet-backed coup, 
which declared the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia (‘SSR of Armenia’) on 
29 November 1920. The Soviet Azerbaijan government, in support of the coup, 
issued a proclamation acknowledging the three provinces as integral parts of 
Soviet Armenia,54 re-affirmed by Armenia and Azerbaijan in June 1921.55  
On 4 July 1921, the Caucasian Bureau refused a suggestion to include 
Karabagh in Armenia and ‘conduct [a] plebiscite in Nagorno-Karabagh only’.56 
Stalin’s divide-and-rule strategy was instead implemented by leaving Zangezour 
in Armenia and transferring Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan as promised to Turkey 
by art 5 of the Treaty of Kars.57 On 7 July 1923, the Transcaucasian Socialist 
Federate Republic dismembered the autonomous region and instead created the 
oblast of Nagorno Karabagh as an isolated enclave surrounded by its former 
counties.58 
                                                 
 51 Ibid 182. 
 52 Ibid 288, 403. 
 53 Opened for signature 10 August 1920 (not in force), reproduced in Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, The Treaties of Peace 1919–1923 (1924) vol II, 789. Article 88 of the 
treaty included de jure recognition of the Republic of Armenia. Whilst Azerbaijan’s 
statehood was never an issue in adjudication, the Mixed Tribunal of Cairo held in a debt 
claim that Armenia had existed but its statehood was subsequently extinguished by the 
Soviet conquest: Achikian v Bank of Athens (Mixed Tribunal of Cairo, Egypt) [1923–24] 
Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 18. However, a Greek Court of First 
Instance ruled that since the Treaty of Sevrès was not ratified, Armenia did not acquire de 
jure statehood and, accordingly, no diplomatic immunity: In Re Armenian Chargé d’Affaires 
(Court of First Instance of Athens, Greece) [1923–24] Annual Digest of Public International 
Law Cases 301. 
 54 Avakian, above n 28, 30.  
 55 Ibid 7. 
 56 Ibid. 
 57  Signed 13 October 1921 (ratified 11 September 1922). 
 58  de Waal, above n 2, 130. 
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In these counties, the Azeri authorities instituted repopulation programmes in 
order to further isolate Artsakh Armenians from the SSR of Armenia, promote 
their assimilation into Azerbaijan and, above all, discourage any ambitions to 
join the SSR of Armenia. The Armenian population never reconciled itself to 
Azeri rule; petitions and protests increased in the Khrushchev years, culminating 
in the ‘Letter of the Thirteen’ in 1965.59 That document by leading Artsakh 
Armenian intellectuals complained of cultural and economic discrimination 
compared to the rest of Soviet Azerbaijan. The committee petitioned for the 
territory to be transferred in order to end the attempt to drive Armenians out by 
gradual cultural suffocation as in Nakhichevan.60 
These periodic appeals — despite the transfer of the Crimea from Russia to 
the Ukraine in 1954 — were denied by citing art 78 of the Soviet Constitution, 
which prohibited the alteration of a Soviet Republic’s territory without its 
consent.61  
During the period of perestroika in the 1980s, the protests of the Artsakh 
Armenians in Stepanakert calling for ‘unification’ with Soviet Armenia and 
demonstrations of solidarity in Yerevan escalated to inter-communal violence. 
The first and only ‘Soviet civil war’ began in April 1991 with the deportations 
and pogroms carried out by OMON Azeri forces62 in the Armenian-populated 
county of Shahumyan, better known as ‘Operation Ring’.63 
This brief description of the Soviet years demonstrates both the Azeri feeling 
of ownership of the province and the Armenian sentiment of justice denied.64 
Upon independence, this dispute caused war and has since polarised political 
debate in both countries. The dismemberment of the province in 1923 is a 
sensitive consideration for any final solution due to the tenuous and 
self-regulated military situation.65 
D Independence, War and Ceasefire: 1991–2007 
On 23 August 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia declared independence 
from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, on 30 August 1991, the 
Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan followed suit. On 18 October 1991, the newly 
independent Republic of Azerbaijan adopted a Constitutional Act,66 art 2 of 
which declares the Republic of Azerbaijan to be the direct legal successor of the 
                                                 
 59 Tchilingirian, above n 14, 442. 
 60 Ibid 441–2. 
 61 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1977). Article 
78 provides that ‘territory of a Union Republic may not be altered without its consent’. The 
Constitution was adopted on 7 October 1977 and was in force until the dissolution of the 
USSR. 
 62 ‘OMON’ is a Russian acronym of ‘Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniya’, which is often 
known as the ‘Special Purpose Police Squad’. 
 63 Caroline Cox and John Eibner, Ethnic Cleansing in Progress: War in Nagorno Karabakh 
(2005) <http://sumgait.info/caroline-cox/ethnic-cleansing-in-progress/operation-ring.htm> 
at 23 May 2008. 
 64 For more detailed analysis of the Soviet period, see Ronald Suny, The Revenge of the Past: 
Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1993) 132–8; Rogers 
Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(1996) 108. 
 65 See below Part III(D). 
 66 Avakian, above n 28, 11. 
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1918 Republic of Azerbaijan and art 3 of which denounces the Treaty on the 
Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Thus, the Republic of 
Azerbaijan expressly rejected its secession to the SSR of Azerbaijan, with 
important consequences for the legal effects of independence. This decision, as 
discussed below, was partly designed to avoid art 3 of the Soviet Law on 
Secession 1990, which permitted Artsakh to decide its own territorial status by 
referendum.67 This was conducted on 10 December 1991 with an overwhelming 
majority voting for independence, unification with the SSR of Armenia not being 
an option. On 23 November 1991, Azerbaijan abolished the autonomy of 
Karabagh, an act that the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee declared 
unconstitutional.68  
The 1994 ceasefire, ending six years of armed conflict, left Armenian forces 
in de facto control of most of historical Artsakh prior to its 1923 division. This 
includes the Nagorny Karabagh oblast created in 1923, as well as Karrachar, 
Jabrail, Kovsakan, Kashunik and Kashatagh.69 Thirty-five per cent of Aghdam 
and 25 per cent of Fizuli, outside of the historical borders, are also 
Armenian-occupied.70 Azeri forces occupy the Shahumyan (Goranboy) region, 
as well as parts of the Mardakert and Martuni regions.71 In total, 217 800 
Armenian refugees and 739 000 Azeri refugees remain displaced.72  
III LEGAL POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES 
This section describes, analyses and criticises the positions adopted in the 
course of peace negotiations. The casus belli — Artsakh’s political status — has 
been the core issue that has scuppered hopes of a peace deal. This piece proposes 
that a litigated solution to the conflict ought to be seriously considered. Whilst a 
political solution remains possible, the intransigent and polarised positions of the 
two states suggest that adversarial litigation may be a more appropriate 
mechanism of dispute settlement.  
A The Position Adopted by the Parties to the Dispute 
It is clear that states adopt particular dispute paradigms in order to maximise 
bargaining leverage and appease their domestic constituencies.73 Armenia and 
the NKR portray the armed conflict as an NKR insurgency against Azerbaijan, 
with Armenia involved merely as an interested spectator.74 This view extracts 
indirect recognition from Azerbaijan of the legal existence — and thence the 
unilateral secession — of the NKR.75 This paradigm is incorrect for the 
following reasons. First, the armed conflict eventually intensified into an 
interstate conflict with full participation of regular forces, particularly from 1992 
                                                 
 67 Ibid 33. 
 68 Ibid 15. 
 69 The names above are Azeri. The Armenian names are Kelbajar, Jebrail, Zangelan, Gubatly 
and Lachin respectively. 
 70 de Waal, above n 2, 286. 
 71 Ibid. 
 72 Ibid 285. 
 73 Croissant, above n 12, 107. 
 74 de Waal, above n 2, 162. 
 75 Tim Potier, Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (2001) 93.  
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until 1994. Second, since the end of the armed conflict, the NKR has been fully 
integrated into the Armenian military, economic and foreign relations spheres. 
Third, the NKR could not economically survive but for the provision made for it 
in the Armenian budget.76 Finally, the apparent aim of the Armenian people of 
Artsakh, from 1918 to the present day, has not been the creation of a separate 
state, but rather reunification with the Republic of Armenia.77 
By contrast, Azerbaijan seeks to portray the armed conflict as strictly a 
‘belligerency’ with Armenia.78 This demonstrates that Armenia has occupied 
‘sovereign Azeri territory’,79 that the ‘occupation’ is a consequence of an 
unlawful use of force and that Armenia therefore has no territorial claim.80 This 
is also submitted to be erroneous. First, the conflict was primarily waged at a 
local level, in that inter-communal clashes in Artsakh gradually escalated to the 
interstate level, both in 1918–20 and 1988–94.81 Second, before and since its 
inclusion within Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction, the Armenian population of Artsakh 
continuously agitated for unification with Armenia.82 Third, the region has never 
been part of the territory of independent Azerbaijan, which constitutes the 
underlying assumption of the Azeri case. The principle of territorial integrity was 
not engaged, although certainly both states prima facie violated the prohibition of 
the use of force and the art 33 principle requiring pacific means of dispute 
settlement. 
B Legal Position of Armenia and the NKR 
Armenia and the NKR assert that the people of the NKR have exercised their 
right to self-determination as enshrined alongside that of the territorial integrity 
of states.83 They rely upon the following grounds to support the submission that 
self-determination gave rise to a right of unilateral secession. First, art 3 of the 
Soviet Law on Secession 1990 permitted the province to determine its own 
political status by a plebiscite, which took place in 1991.84 Second, the NKR is a 
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state according to art 1 of the Montevideo Convention,85 notwithstanding the 
absence of international recognition. Third, even if the NKR were part of 
Azerbaijan, the principle of territorial integrity is conditional upon the right of 
self-determination; denial of cultural autonomy and systematic violation of 
human rights gave rise to a right to unilateral secession.86  
There are a number of problems with these arguments. The first is that 
Azerbaijan, through its rejection of its Soviet legal heritage, has no obligations 
by virtue of Soviet law; it is therefore not obliged to implement the Soviet Law 
on Secession 1990. Even if it were, the law was clearly intended, particularly 
under art 1, to obstruct the process of secession that was already underway. The 
fact that not a single Union Republic seceded on the basis of the law is testament 
to its irrelevance to the claims to statehood that were accepted.87 Moreover, 
neither Abkhazia, South Ossetia, nor Transdniestra implemented art 3 nor relied 
upon it for their ‘secessions’. Thus, the position under Soviet constitutional law 
is immaterial. 
Second, the NKR does not satisfy the factual criteria for statehood under the 
Montevideo Convention. The NKR’s dependence upon and fusion with Armenia 
is to such a high degree, especially in external relations where state practice 
requires ‘independence’ or ‘sovereignty’,88 that the case is in this respect 
analogous to that of Manchukuo — a ‘puppet state’ created by Japan that was for 
all purposes a Japanese colony.89 Indeed, the NKR would be unable to survive 
without sponsorship from Armenia proper.90 As defined in the Island of Palmas 
case, ‘sovereignty … signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion 
of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the 
functions of a State’.91 The NKR thus fails to meet the fundamental ingredients 
for statehood. Therefore, notwithstanding its claims to independence, the NKR is 
akin to a satellite state — if not a de facto province — of Armenia.92 
However, the most fundamental difficulty is that the Armenian argument is 
entirely based upon self-determination, which has a vague and amorphous status 
under international law.93 It is increasingly acknowledged that self-determination 
encompasses minority cultural rights and a prohibition of discrimination by the 
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state (‘internal self-determination’).94 However, whilst a customary rule and 
perhaps even jus cogens,95 self-determination nonetheless does not embody a 
general right to unilateral secession (‘external self-determination’).96 
International law is neutral on the phenomenon of secession: it neither prohibits 
nor authorises it. A right is only vested in specific contexts, such as in a 
non-self-governing territory in decolonisation,97 or inversely in a colony to block 
cession to another state.98  
There is a school of thought, notably advanced by Professor Otto Kimminich, 
which interprets the UN’s Declaration on Friendly Relations99 to mean that, as 
long as a state respects the rights of minority groups, 
these groups can find their protection within the State in accordance with 
present-day international law. As soon as that State consistently violates these 
rights a situation arises in which the … ethnic group may invoke its right of 
self-determination in order to bring about constitutional changes within the State 
or to find an international solution by seceding.100  
However, this differs from the orthodox view that self-determination constitutes 
‘internal’ rights within the state: cultural, economic and political rights of 
autonomy equal to those of other inhabitants.101 Even more dubious is the notion 
that the territorial sovereignty of a state is conditional upon respect for 
self-determination and human rights of an ethnic minority within its borders.102 
As Professor Crawford explains, Bangladesh’s unilateral secession from Pakistan 
is the only example in modern international law of a seceding territory attaining 
international recognition of its statehood.103  
Parallels with the Kosovo situation are unfounded because the territorial title 
to Kosovo has long been held by Serbia. Recognition of Kosovar statehood by a 
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small number of states104 does not ‘constitute’ its legal basis,105 especially given 
that there is a strong argument that such recognition constitutes a breach of an 
obligation to continuously recognise the territorial integrity of Serbia imposed by 
the UN Security Council.106 Moreover, although superficially supporting the 
argument that state practice is moving towards the conditionality of territorial 
title upon respect for self-determination, the Kosovo example is distinguishable 
because the Security Council, despite initially and expressly recognising the 
territorial integrity of Serbia, may (if Russian opposition ceases) attempt to claim 
the right to dispose of Serbia’s territory in order to impose independence without 
Serbia’s consent.107 Mandates must be addressed carefully because they 
represent extreme cases whereby the will of the international community can 
trump state consent, contravening the pillars of sovereignty and equality between 
states, encapsulated in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. 
Moreover, international recognition of Kosovar independence does not oblige 
Serbia to recognise Kosovo — it can hold out so long as it can withstand 
political pressure. Moreover, such recognition, if taken without a Security 
Council mandate, would arguably constitute an internationally wrongful act.108 
Thus, Armenian hopes that Kosovo will prove a ‘precedent’ for Artsakh may be 
in vain; even if it does, it will likely come with unpalatable conditions to appease 
Azerbaijan.109 In particular, recognition would likely be conditional upon not 
unifying with another state, as was imposed upon Austria following both World 
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Wars;110 upon Cyprus with independence from the British Empire;111 and was 
proposed under the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo.112 Unless the vast majority of 
states recognise Kosovo and thereby change customary international law, the 
case does not alter the legal position regarding unilateral secession. 
C Legal Position of Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan claims that upon its secession from the Soviet Union under the 
principle of uti possidetis juris, it ‘inherited’ both Nakhichevan and Artsakh 
within its borders.113 Therefore, Armenia has ‘occupied’ Azeri territory in 
violation of its obligation to respect the territorial integrity of UN member states 
under arts 2 and 33 of the UN Charter. Self-determination remains subject to 
territorial integrity in all cases, and the suppressive measures taken against 
secessionist rebels on Azeri territory (which would have succeeded but for the 
intervention of Armenia) were strictly an internal Azeri matter.114 
Notwithstanding the repeated instances of state persecution of the Armenian 
minority population in Artsakh and Azerbaijan proper, the territorial title of 
Azerbaijan remains intact.  
It is submitted that the fatal flaw in this argument is its presupposition that the 
disputed territories in question are Azeri territory. Although there is certainly a 
territorial claim to be made, it is not an incontrovertible fact that the region was 
ever part of independent Azerbaijan. The controversy of the matter is 
demonstrated by the League of Nations’ rejection of Azerbaijan’s application for 
membership in December 1920 on the ground that its frontiers with Armenia 
were ‘insufficiently clear’, and by the Treaty of Sevrès, art 92 of which called 
upon the states to resolve their territorial disputes by peaceful settlement. 
By renouncing its Soviet legal heritage, the Republic of Azerbaijan not only 
rejected its legal obligations stemming from Soviet Azerbaijan as its successor, 
but it also rejected its rights stemming from that source: namely, its jurisdictional 
competence, as distinct from sovereign competence,115 over both Artsakh116 and 
Nakhichevan.117 Had Azerbaijan accepted its Soviet legal heritage, Armenia, as 
the successor to the SSR of Armenia, would have been bound to recognise 
Azerbaijan’s inherited right to the ‘protectorate’ of Nakhichevan. However, 
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Azerbaijan would have likewise been bound to recognise that, by Soviet law, 
Artsakh validly exercised its right to unilateral secession upon Azerbaijan’s 
declaration of independence. By declaring itself the legal successor to the first 
Republic of Azerbaijan, contemporary Azerbaijan inherited only those rights and 
obligations that the former possessed. 
Azerbaijan’s case is based upon the principle of uti possidetis juris: namely, 
that administrative borders within the Soviet Union became internationalised 
upon the secession of the Union Republics. Azerbaijan has hedged its bets with 
the Constitutional Act on the State Independence of Azerbaijan,118 particularly in 
arts 2 and 3,119 wherein it declares itself successor to the First Republic of 
Azerbaijan and denounces the Treaty of Establishment of the Soviet Union. 
D Current Status of Negotiations 
The discussion above addresses the current situation from the standpoint of 
international law but international diplomacy operates with a different 
methodology. Whilst the latter observes legal principles, it broadly encourages 
reconciliation and compromise rather than strict enforcement of legal rights. The 
OSCE Minsk Group has been involved in conducting negotiations along these 
lines since the 1994 ceasefire.120 
However, the history of the negotiations demonstrates that the positions of the 
parties have hardened over time and that the political environments of the two 
nations have precluded the possibility of reaching compromises.121 The brief 
hopes raised by the Key West talks in 2001 and their subsequent dramatic 
collapse,122 demonstrates the strength of domestic positions on the issue and the 
triumph of political factors over legal considerations. 
The failure to achieve agreement after 12 years of dialogue demonstrates the 
width of the gulf between the two sides and the unlikelihood that this gulf can be 
bridged in the foreseeable future. In a recent press statement, the three co-Chairs 
of the OSCE Minsk Group declared their dissatisfaction with the current state of 
negotiations. The Co-Chairs concluded with the following observations 
regarding the steps by which a solution could progress: 
The principles [for resolution] are based on the redeployment of Armenian troops 
from Azerbaijani territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, with special modalities 
for Kelbajar and Lachin districts (including a corridor between Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh), demilitarization of those territories, and a referendum … to 
determine the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh. … Regarding the vote to 
determine the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Co-Chairs stressed that 
suitable pre-conditions … would have to be achieved so that the vote would take 
place in a non-coercive environment … after a vigorous debate in the public 
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arena. Unfortunately, at their most recent meeting … the Presidents did not reach 
agreement on these principles. 
Although no additional meetings between the sides under the auspices of the 
Co-Chairs are planned for the immediate future, they will be ready to reengage if 
the parties decide to pursue the talks with the political will that has thus far been 
lacking.123  
The most sensitive issue is clearly the final status of Artsakh, which would be 
determined by referendum. The presumption is that the boundaries of Artsakh 
are not its historical borders, but those created by the SSR of Azerbaijan in 1923. 
However, the presumption acknowledges the strategic sensitivity of the 
contiguous regions to Armenia. Ultimately, the absence of political will and the 
mutual intransigence throughout the negotiations means that a negotiated 
settlement, though a worthy goal, has low prospects of success. 
A recent International Crisis Group report supports this conclusion. The report 
found the status quo unsustainable, and that by the year 2012 — when its oil 
revenues begin to decline — Azerbaijan may attempt to use force to occupy the 
territory,124 which would surely violate art 33 of the UN Charter. Moreover, the 
report identifies the main obstacle to a negotiated solution as the mutual 
intransigence of the two populations, reinforced by the nationalistic rhetoric of 
state officials.125 In this situation, which contains the ingredients for resumption 
of the armed conflict, litigation is the optimum way forward, affording both 
parties the opportunity to argue adversarially in a court of law. 
However, the adjudication option has its own problems. The first is the 
question of forum. There is an apparent tension between the parties, wherein 
Azerbaijan prefers the UN, and Armenia the OSCE.126 This may be a source of 
contention in negotiations for a shift to an adjudication framework, namely, 
whether to submit the dispute to the ICJ, the OSCE Court, or to constitute an ad 
hoc arbitral tribunal. Factors affecting the choice of forum include litigation 
costs, past jurisprudence, current membership, and the terms of reference.  
 A second problem is the nature of litigation itself. The ICJ, for instance, has 
been criticised for adopting a conciliatory approach in its past jurisprudence.127 
In a territorial dispute of this kind, where a definitive and principled decision is 
necessary, such an approach would be hazardous. The issue of compliance, 
which in ICJ land boundary cases has been problematic,128 also arises. However, 
after a certain period of resistance, losing states have generally complied with the 
judgments in question.129 
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IV POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE DISPUTE 
In 1963, in what remains a seminal authority on territorial sovereignty, 
Professor Jennings observed the following conundrum facing international law: 
We find that in addition to the 5 orthodox modes for the acquisition of territorial 
sovereignty, there is the case of the emergence of the new State — by far the most 
important case of territorial change at the present time — in regard to which, 
however, international law is singularly undeveloped, uncertain, and, it must be 
said, comparatively unstudied.130 
This section, in advancing legal conclusions regarding the conflict, addresses this 
issue head on. The implications of formulating clear legal principles in this area 
are potentially far-reaching for the Artsakh dispute, and would be of similar 
value for the settlement of territorial disputes in general. The general principle of 
modern international law regarding settlement of boundaries between states is 
that the exclusive competence for their determination lies solely with the two 
states concerned. Consequently, the general prohibition on the use of force for 
the settlement of disputes allows for only cession and arbitration as modes for 
the acquisition of title.131  
A Principles of Territorial Sovereignty 
Two observations can be made at the outset. The first is that recognition by 
third states of another’s claim to territorial title does not serve as a legal basis for 
title.132 Where there is a prima facie territorial dispute, the consent of state B to a 
negotiated settlement with state A, or to submit the dispute to adjudication, is 
required for settlement of the disputed territory’s legal status.133 This applies not 
only in disputes concerning frontier boundaries between states, but also in the 
event of a new state emerging from the territory of another. As Oppenheim 
observes, ‘the formation of a new State is … a matter of fact and not of law. It is 
through recognition, which is a matter of law, that such a new State becomes a 
subject of International Law’.134  
The formation of a new state can occur through disintegration, secession or 
devolution.135 Secession, in particular, may arise through various scenarios: at 
one extreme, through a war of independence culminating in recognition by the 
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parent state of the seceding state’s existence,136 and at the other, the use of 
constitutional mechanisms for the latter’s secession. In either case, recognition 
by the parent state is the axis of the test; prior to recognition, the new state’s 
factual independence is de facto, subsequently it is de jure or ‘as of right’.137 
The second observation is that the contemporary prohibition on the use of 
force to settle disputes contrasts with the position before the adoption of the UN 
Charter.138 The conceptual problem with this change is that it presumes existing 
territorial title to be legal at the time of ratification of the UN Charter and does 
not demand compulsory jurisdiction for the adjudication of such disputes.139 
Under current law, annexation with its legal basis as conquest per se is 
unlawful. However, although states have, in practice, used force as a means of de 
facto acquisition of territory from another state,140 such acquisitions have (albeit 
inconsistently)141 been at the peril of collective non-recognition142 and even 
individual143 or collective144 use of force to eject the putative conqueror. Thus, 
the territorial title to Artsakh remains disputed, and will remain so until both 
parties consent to settle the dispute by treaty or adjudication. 
B Legal Consequences of the Soviet Collapse 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union raises a crucial issue for the Artsakh 
dispute; namely, the legal basis upon which Armenia and Azerbaijan acquired de 
jure statehood. The emergence of successor states to the Soviet Union in 1991 
was a fait accompli which the international community was compelled to 
recognise by the momentum of historical events.145 De jure statehood came with 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 8 December 1991.146 The presence of 
these objective criteria gives rise to a de facto state; the acquisition of de jure 
statehood comes by means of parent state recognition.147 This was the case in the 
secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, where the latter was regarded as the 
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continuation of the former Pakistan notwithstanding the loss of more than half of 
its population and territory, and so no member of the international community 
(apart from India) recognised Bangladeshi independence until Pakistan first did 
so.148 Moreover, so long as the parent state refuses to recognise the secession, it 
has the right to attempt to use force to bring the seceding territory back under its 
control.149 
Soviet recognition of its own dissolution therefore rendered the secessions 
lawful. However, this did not operate identically for every seceding state. The 
Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan did not exist prior to Sovietisation, and hence became new states.150 
For the Baltic states, the doctrine of reversion was generally accepted to apply 
due to the illegality of the Soviet Union’s annexations in 1940,151 with important 
legal consequences.152 Moldova immediately sought reunification with Rumania, 
being for centuries a disputed buffer territory between Rumania and the Russian 
Empire; consequently, statehood was new for it as well.153 
For Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, claims to have reverted to pre-Soviet 
independence, like the Baltic States, have been given less credence due mainly to 
the fact that their independence occurred between 1917–21,154 whereas the Baltic 
States were independent until the more recent date of 1940. Although the 
implications of the doctrine of reversion for the Transcaucasian States have been 
dismissed,155 in the context of territorial disputes such as the Artsakh conflict, 
those implications have the potential to be profound.   
International recognition of the new successor states occurred according to 
internal Soviet administrative borders, following state practice regarding the 
former Yugoslavia.156 Thus, regarding the criterion of territory, international 
recognition was granted to all the former Union Republics of the Soviet Union as 
successor states, but not to any of the five autonomous regions that claimed 
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statehood.157 Where there were no territorial disputes between the new states, 
this policy was uncontroversial. However, continuing international recognition of 
internal Soviet borders does not reflect this fact. 
It is submitted that international recognition of any of the four remaining 
putative states as successors to the Soviet Union cannot serve as the legal basis 
for territorial title. Nor can non-recognition be conclusive of their status. All four 
entities firstly fail the Montevideo Convention’s objective criteria for statehood, 
since they remain ‘puppet states’ — they do not possess the crucial criterion of 
‘independence’.158 Thus, Artsakh’s claim to statehood is a faulty stratagem, since 
the international community may apply political pressure upon Azerbaijan to 
recognise Artsakh, but Azerbaijan may reject this pressure and refuse. The 
potential for stalemate through the principle of consent is reflected in the ability 
of losing belligerents to withhold recognition of the loss of disputed territory.159 
A current example is Serbia’s refusal to recognise Kosovo’s secession.160  
Thus, the issue is whether Armenia and Azerbaijan recovered their pre-1921 
independence, or whether they became new states in the eyes of the international 
community via recognition. In the cases of Poland, India and the Baltic states, 
the successor states reverted to a legal identity pre-existing the intervening 
period.161 As seen above, this is the legal position adopted by Azerbaijan in order 
to avoid Soviet law and foster nationalism.162 If the doctrine of reversion 
operates, it removes the intervening Soviet jurisdiction for the determination of 
the frontier between the two states. If the doctrine of reversion does not operate, 
then pre-1920 Armenia and Azerbaijan in legal terms never existed — the 
paradigm is solely that of successors to the Soviet Union.  
C Legal Consequences of 1918–20 
If the doctrine of reversion operates, then the de facto statehood of the first 
Republics is relevant for the purpose of the common frontier between their 
successors. Under the doctrine of intertemporal law, which prevents 
retrospective application of law, traditional international law becomes applicable 
to the case. This recognises two applicable modes of acquisitive title: cession and 
conquest.163 Right of conquest constituted a good basis for acquisitive title under 
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customary international law, by which a state’s occupation of a disputed 
territory, with intent to extend its jurisdiction over that territory, could constitute 
a legal basis for annexation.164 
Although at the beginning of the 20th century a shift from conquest to 
self-determination to determine a territory’s political status may have begun,165 
following the Great War, states refused to abandon conquest as a legal basis for 
acquisitive title.166 It was not until the advent of the UN Charter following 
World War II that conquest became an unlawful basis for title per se, although 
that has not prevented states from occupying and justifying the annexation on 
alternative legal bases.167 
As seen above, Artsakh, Zangezour and Nakhichevan remained disputed 
territories until January 1920, whereupon it was clear that their status would not 
be settled at the Paris Peace Conference as anticipated.168 Whilst it is arguable 
that territorial dispositions of the victorious Allied Powers following the Great 
War established self-determination as a legal basis for title,169 the principle was 
rarely applied. Armenia could plead conquest as a legal basis by the fact of its 
occupation and subsequent undisputed sovereignty from April to July 1920. Due 
to the collapse of Azerbaijan, a peace treaty of cession was never concluded. 
However, Armenia could base its claim on the other modes of annexation: 
proclamations of annexation and performance of state functions. 
The Azeri case for conquest would be argued on the basis of Sultanov’s 
regime. However, this is problematic because the regime was temporary and 
expressly conditional upon resolution of the territory’s final status at the Paris 
Peace Conference, and so cannot be relied upon as a legal basis for title. Thus, 
Armenia could claim to have had an inchoate title that ‘revived’ upon 
independence in 1991, whereas Azerbaijan would have to counterclaim that the 
status of the province was merely disputed.  
D Proposed Legal Basis for Adjudication of Territorial Title 
As seen above, good title can arise in the modern system by three acquisitive 
modes: cession, acquiescence and adjudication. Cession would involve bilateral 
agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning determination of their 
common frontier, which the OSCE Co-Chairs propose be done by plebiscite.170 
Acquiescence involves the failure by a state to assert a claim to title over a 
territory when it can reasonably be expected to do so.171 This section submits 
that the first appears unlikely given the mutual political intransigence as to the 
territory’s final status; that the second may operate for Nakhichevan and 
Zangezour but not Artsakh; and proposes that the third be adopted as the most 
practical mode for resolution of this dispute. Given the deadlock in political 
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dialogue, which shows every sign of continuing into the near future, it is 
submitted that the third means of awarding good title is more amenable to the 
political mood of confrontation dominant in the two countries. The task is 
therefore to explore legal bases for an adjudicated award of territorial title. 
1 Unilateral Self-Determination 
In the adjudication context, the first model that can most easily be discarded is 
that currently advocated by Armenia, namely, that the NKR be declared an 
independent state. Under international law, there is no general right of a ‘people’ 
to secede from the parent state outside of the constitutional framework of that 
state.172 Although the case of Reference re Secession of Québec suggests that 
there exists a specific right in an instance of alien subjugation,173 there has 
hitherto been no evidence of state practice concerning such a right. Moreover, 
the proposition is problematic because the Supreme Court of Canada never 
identified who is to identify when the right is engaged, and how.  
Whilst Armenia could rely upon the Western Sahara opinion174 as support for 
its claim of unilateral self-determination, this would be dubious because the 
NKR does not satisfy the factual criteria for statehood by asserting independent 
control over its territory. Moreover, the Western Sahara opinion was decided in 
the context of decolonisation, a distinct context to secession from a federative 
state. 
2 Uti Possidetis 
The second model is on the basis of uti possidetis, a principle which operates 
upon possession at the time of secession and would render the territory part of 
Azerbaijan.175 It was first applied in the decolonisation of South America, where 
the successors to the Spanish Empire expressly agreed inter se that each new 
state acquired sovereign title over those territories it possessed. Thus, colonial 
administrative boundaries — often highly obscure over unexplored lands — 
became international frontiers, despite never being conceived of as such.176 This 
was for two policy reasons: to forestall violent territorial disputes by committing 
to pacific resolution of boundary disputes and to deter European powers from 
colonising territory terra nullius.177 This novel application of uti possidetis 
produced a regional custom binding upon Spanish South America.178 The key 
factor is that this arose by common agreement, conforming to the general 
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principle that the determination of frontiers lies within the exclusive competence 
of the states concerned. 
The second instance of uti possidetis was in the decolonisation of Africa. The 
new states agreed to apply both external borders between colonies and internal 
borders within each colony as the basis for their new frontiers.179 The 
arbitrariness of these geometric lines was noted by Judge Ajibola in his separate 
opinion in Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad).180 Nonetheless, the successors by 
their agreement to apply uti possidetis rendered that principle a regional custom, 
which has generally been applied to African territorial disputes.181 Again, the 
crucial factor was common agreement between the states concerned. 
On the basis of these two regional customs, some commentators assert that uti 
possidetis now constitutes a general international custom in state succession.182 
The claim is based upon Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali)183 and the 
Second Opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Commission.184 However, it is 
doubtful that either the former, in which the ICJ was at pains to show that a 
regional custom in decolonisation could also be applied elsewhere,185 or the 
latter, resulting in the Commission (leaving aside jurisdictional difficulties) 
being accused of opaque and dubious legal technique,186 constitutes a solid 
interpretive basis for a universally binding international custom. 
On the contrary, modern state practice in the two cases of secession from a 
federative state with territorial disputes points in another direction. In the 
collapse of the former Yugoslavia, the belligerent states clearly did not apply uti 
possidetis and the Commission had no jurisdiction to impose the principle 
without their consent.187 Moreover, the absence of consent amongst the 
successors to the Soviet Union is highly significant because even if uti possidetis 
applies generally, the ‘persistent objector’ rule would preclude it here in light of 
the conduct of Armenia and Russia. 
In the Alma Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,188 uti possidetis is entirely 
absent, unlike in similar instruments in South America and Africa.189 Professor 
Shaw asserts that 
while these instruments do not specifically differentiate between uti possidetis as 
turning internal boundaries into international boundaries … it is clear that the 
intention was to assert an uti possidetis doctrine, not least since this would 
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provide international and regional (as well as crucial national) legitimacy for the 
new borders.190  
This assertion cannot be sustained in light of the conduct of the successors. 
Whilst the Alma Ata Declaration mentioned ‘territorial integrity’, this principle 
is distinct from uti possidetis. The latter is a mechanism that can determine 
where the border is, while the former protects that border after determination.191 
The oft repeated justification for uti possidetis is, according to the ICJ, ‘to 
prevent the independence and stability of new states being endangered by 
fratricidal struggles’.192 War, however, has inexorably come with a decision 
made against the wishes of the inhabitants of the province concerned. Even in 
South America and Africa, where states consented to uti possidetis in order to 
prevent war, several have nonetheless occurred as a direct consequence of 
frustration of popular will.193 Nationalistic aspirations within states that are 
created on geometric lines blind to history, geography or ethnicity, have forced a 
shift to self-determination to adjust territorial boundaries and prevent war.194  
3 Self-Determination in the Interstate Context 
This leads to the third model of self-determination; namely, that of an 
interstate territorial dispute resolved on the basis of plebiscite in the territory 
concerned. Whilst this is proposed as the legal basis for settlement in the instant 
case, it remains problematic. The underlying legitimacy associated with the word 
arises because of democratic sensibilities — if the people of a given territory 
freely choose their own political status, this presumably results in peace and 
contentment. However, the determination of borders then becomes a matter of 
votes, which is not a panacea guaranteed to achieve ‘justice’. 
The first problem is population: does an ‘indigenous people’ possess greater 
right to determine their homeland’s political status than other, ‘non-indigenous’ 
residents?195 The Azeris would argue that self-determination ought to accord 
greater weight to their claims than the Armenians’ because the Azeris are the 
‘indigenous’ people of the province, and vice versa.  
                                                 
 190 Ibid 110. 
 191 Ibid 152. 
 192 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 554, 565. 
 193 See, eg, Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v 
Nicaragua) (Judgment) [1960] ICJ Rep 192; Land Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvador v Honduras) (Judgment) [1992] ICJ Rep 351; Land and Maritime Boundary 
Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ 303; 
Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad) (Judgment) [1994] ICJ Rep 6. 
 194 See, eg, Bongfen Chem-Langhee, The Paradoxes of Self-Determination in the Cameroon 
under United Kingdom Administration: The Search for Identity, Well-Being and Continuity 
(2003) 172 on the plebiscites conducted in the territories of the British colony of Cameroon.  
 195 For example, the ‘indigenous’ Abkhaz people of Abkhazia, who possess a distinctive 
culture, religion and language, became a minority in their own homeland as a result of 
colonisation. Even following the expulsion of the Georgian population, the Abkhaz 
constitute a mere plurality. Do the Abkhaz people possess greater right to determine 
Abkhazia’s status? This is a difficult problem where application of self-determination 
through participation of Georgian refugees in any plebiscite may prove unfeasible and 
provoke the resumption of hostilities at the local level: see Edward Mihalkalin, ‘The 
Abkhazians: A National Minority in Their Own Homeland’ in Tozun Bahcheli, Barry 
Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik (eds), De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty (2004) 
143. 
214 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 9 
 The second problem with self-determination is territorial delimitation. As 
the history of the conflict shows, the SSR of Azerbaijan altered the historic 
borders of the region. This leaves open the question of who should determine the 
status of these lands: the Armenians who were removed; the Kurds and Azeris 
who were brought in; or the Armenians who have resettled since the 
ceasefire?196 
The ‘doctrine of the critical date’ may prove decisive, since it freezes time so 
that any state actions or changes of circumstance following the ‘critical date’ are 
immaterial for the purpose of determining title. The doctrine has its origin in the 
Island of Palmas case where the arbiter fixed the date of a treaty as the critical 
date.197 One candidate is the signing of the Alma Ata Declaration on 21 
December 1991. Fixing the critical date at this point would leave three modes of 
acquisitive title: conquest, uti possidetis and self-determination. The preferred 
avenue is self-determination, since, despite practical problems of 
implementation, its reliance upon democratic consultation rather than conquest 
holds more promise for a lasting solution to the dispute.  
4 Co-sovereignty 
There remains one creative but impractical solution to the dispute at hand: 
co-sovereignty. Precedents include the agreements regarding Andorra198 and 
Monaco.199 However, it has been dismissed as unrealistic because of its rejection 
in the only other cases where it has been mooted on the grounds that it 
contravened the wishes of the inhabitants, which would not be conducive to the 
goal of a lasting peace.200 This has a superficial attractiveness in that it would aid 
the reconciliation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as ensure 
that both states are seen to save face. However, it is unlikely to be politically 
acceptable.  
E Impact on Territorial Sovereignty in International Law 
How should self-determination be applied, and what would be the 
implications for international law? As discussed above, the scope of 
self-determination is constrained to ‘internal’ self-determination. It does not yet 
equate to a general right to ‘external’ self-determination to determine the 
political status of one’s territory.201 Whilst the current status of Kosovo may 
indicate a shift towards state violation of ‘internal’ self-determination giving rise 
to ‘external’ self-determination, such a principle is not yet an international 
custom.202 
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Another analytical method of utilising self-determination is to curtail such a 
right to state succession to a federative state. This is attractive because it 
provides solutions to the problems encountered in the Yugoslav and Soviet 
succession cases. Whilst this may raise fears that the principle could extend to 
other contexts,203 these concerns could be allayed by curtailing the principle to 
particular factual situations. Self-determination would operate within the 
doctrine of reversion: following the secession of Armenia and Azerbaijan from 
the Soviet Union, they reverted to their former statehood. The Artsakh territorial 
dispute was likewise revived, whereby an adjudicator could order that 
sovereignty be determined by referendum as the mode for determination of title. 
How could such a solution affect other territorial disputes? Firstly, the 
principle of sovereignty underpinning the international legal system requires that 
the parties to each dispute either agree through negotiation or submit the case to 
adjudication. Thus, this model would be applicable to South Ossetia, Abkhazia 
and Transdniestra, since they are de facto parts of Russia.  
Self-determination is no panacea, and like any other tool requires a particular 
context to be effective. It is submitted that permitting the people of a territory to 
decide their own status is more likely to eventuate in peace between states and 
peoples than relying upon a principle based upon conquest, which favours 
frontiers ‘drawn with little or no consideration for those factors of geography [or] 
ethnicity … that played a part in boundary determinations elsewhere’ so that 
boundaries in Africa ‘are patently even more artificial than elsewhere, since most 
of them are merely straight lines traced on the drawing board with little 
relevance to the physical circumstances on the ground’.204 
V CONCLUSIONS 
 This article makes the following conclusions regarding the legal aspects of 
the Artsakh conflict: first, Armenia existed as a de jure independent state and 
Azerbaijan existed de facto, prior to their conquest by the Soviet Union in 1920. 
During that period of independence, the two states disputed territorial title to 
three regions: Zangezour, Nakhichevan and Artsakh.  
In 1991, the Union Republics seceded from the Soviet Union. Despite their 
procedural unlawfulness under Soviet law, the Soviet Union recognised the 
secessions, which served as the requisite legal basis for the statehood of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. However, no such recognition was afforded to the claims of 
Artsakh and the other autonomous regions to secession. The Soviet Law on 
Secession 1990 does not consequently serve as a legal basis for their claims to 
statehood. 
There is no general right of a territory to unilaterally secede from a parent 
state under international law. Thus, there is no legal basis for the claim that 
Artsakh exercised a right to self-determination that gave rise to a right to 
unilateral secession from the Soviet Union. As successor states to the Soviet 
Union in 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan reverted to their pre-1920 independence. 
The two states disputed title to three territories, which likewise revived in 1991. 
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The legal dispute is, therefore, not one of the Artsakh region’s secession from 
the Soviet Union or Azerbaijan, but a territorial dispute between the independent 
states of Armenia and Azerbaijan for the territory of Artsakh. Under international 
law, recognition by third states does not serve as the legal basis for the common 
frontier between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Exclusive competence to determine 
that boundary, and thus settle the Artsakh dispute, lies with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. 
Under modern international law, the rule prohibiting the use of force as a 
means to resolve disputes means that there are effectively two modes of 
allocating that boundary: cession or adjudication. Given the lack of progress for 
a political solution, it is suggested that the states opt for a litigated solution. 
Thus, the typical legal analysis of competing principles of territorial integrity 
and self-determination is incorrect. Artsakh was never part of independent 
Azerbaijan, which had no claim to territorial integrity, and Artsakh could not 
legally secede from the Soviet Union unilaterally. An international court or 
tribunal could apply three modes of acquisitive title: conquest in 1920, Soviet 
conquest and allocation to Azerbaijan (applying uti possidetis), and 
self-determination. It is submitted that self-determination is the least problematic 
solution to the instant case and for disputes in the context of succession to 
federative states. 
 
 
